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With loan commitments negotiated in advance, the use of “tight money” to restrain nominal
spending has asymmetric effects upon different categories of borrowers. This can reduce efficiency,
even though aggregate demand is stabilized. This is illustrated in the context of an equilibrium
model of financial intermediation with loan commitments, where monetary policy is characterized
by a supply curve for reserves on the part of the central bank in an inter-bank market.
If demand uncertainty relates primarily to the intensity of demand by each borrower with no
difference in the degree of cyclicality of individual borrowers’ demands, an inelastic supply of
reserves by the central bank is optimal, because it stabilizes aggregate demand and as a result
increases average capacity utilization, But if demand uncertainty relates primarily to the number of
borrowers rather than to each one’s demand for credit, an interest-rate smoothing policy is optimal,





and NBERIn Robert LUCW’Scelebrated analysis, unexpected variations in the money supply
affect economic activity because the suppliers of goods have incomplete information
about the current state of aggregate demand. In Lucas (1972), information is im-
perfect because of the segmentation of goods markets and the existence of shocks to
relative as well as aggregate demand. In the related analysis of Luc= and Woodford
(1994), information is imperfect because retail markets for goods are not Walrssian
auction markets, but instead involve sequential trade. Both models imply that mon-
etary instability reduces the efficiency of the allocation of resources, by impairing the
ability of market prices to induce efficient supply decisions in a decentralized economy.
Such aalyses clearly show that the creation of uncertainty about the level of
nominal aggregate demand as a result of random actions by the central bank is un-
desirable. They fail, however, to show whether it is desirable for a central bank to
adopt operating procedures that imply variation in the money supply in response
to shocks originating elsewhere in the economy. In pmticular, they leave open the
question whether, in the face of real shocks that cause Variatiom in the demand for
bank credit, it is better to keep the money supply constant, at the cost of sharp, un-
expected vmiations in interest rates, or better to accommodate such shocks, allowing
the money supply and bank credit to vary in order to smooth interest rates. This
question is one of considerable practical importance, given the centrality of interest-
rate smoothing among the objectives of actual central banks, 1 and given the fact
that current operating procedures for monetary policy in the United States and else-
where typically involve short-run control of a short-term nominal interest rate (such
M the Federal Funds rate in the U.S.), rather than a monetary aggregate. 2 The
present paper focuses upon this particular aspect of monetary policy, because it is
not necessary to assume that the central bank changes its policy stance in response
to any information about current shocks that is not possessed by private parties and
incorporated into their pricing policies; rather, one may consider the nature of the
optimal supply schedule for reserves on the part of the central bank, given what this
implies about the automatic variations of the money supply in response to shocks
~ that will result from such m operating procedure.
A familiar answer to this question is that of Poole (1970): short-run interest-
rate stabilization is desirable if the main source of disturbances is in the demand
for money balances given a particular level of transactions (“LM shocks” ), since it
prevents such disturbances from affecting aggregate demand in the goods market,
but is undesirable if the main source of disturbances is in the real determinants
of aggregate demand for a given level of interest rates (“IS shocks”), since in that
case the interest-rate smoothing results in greater instability of aggregate demand.
This paper shows, instead, that there may be advantages to interest-rate smoothing
even when the relation between desired spending and desired transactions balances
is completely stable (and indeed, the velocity of money is constant). 3 The reason is
lSee e.g., Miron (1986), Goodfriend (1991), and Meltzer (1995).
2See’e.g., Taylor (1993), and Clarida and Gertler (1995).
3Th; point here is not to deny the importance of stochastic disturbances to money demand in
1not that Poole’s analysis is wrong; in the model presented here, a more elastic supply
of reserves by the central bank does result in greater volatility of aggregate demand,
and as a result both greater instability of aggregate output and a lower average level
of capmity utilization. However, this need not imply a lower level of welfare, when
the allocation of the national product across alternative uses is considered; and it is
here that a simple IS-LM analysis is most inadequate.
The problem with using “tight money” as a way of restraining surges in aggregate
demand due to real causes is that the existence of loan commitments insulates many
firms from the effects of any such tightening, so that the growth of bank lending is
restrained only through a disproportionate effect upon the supply of credit to certain
categories of borrowers, that have not obtained such commitments in advance. 4
As a result, a policy of tightly controlling the money supply will not only stabilize
aggregate output, but will imply that a greater proportion of available output during
high-demand periods will be purchased by certain types of buyers (in practice, larger,
more stable firms) rather thm others (smaller, riskier fires), 5 which need not improve
overall welfare.
The present paper addresses these issues in the context of an explicit equilibrium
model of the effects of monetary policy upon financial intermediation. Fluctuations
in the volume of nominal spending affect the degree of utilization of productive ca-
pacity, because trans~tions in the goods market are subject to a sequential service
constraint, u a result of which supply commitments made to individual buyers cannot
be contingent upon the overall state of demand. The intention is to model equilibrium
in a goods market where goods are allocated through non-price rationing, u seems
to be true in many actual markets, due to the prohibitive informational requirements
for the organization of a competitive auction market. 6 This feature of the model
creates a reason for the control of nominal aggregate demand to matter.
It is assumed that purch~es can only be made using cash borrowed from banks,
in order to create a straightforward link between the volume of bank lending and
aggregate demand. 7 Stochastic variations in the desired level of level of purchases
(absent any change in supply or credit market conditions) occu as a result of random
shocks to household preferences; these shocks are allowed to shift not just the average
intensity of demand for current consumption,” but the distribution of demand across
practice, but to show that the question of the optimaf respon~ to pure “IS shocks” is a more subtle
one than is commonly appreciated,
4This argument was 6rst made by Wojnilower(1980).
5Morgan (1992) shows that the volume of lending under commitments does not significantly
decline after a deliberate tightening of monetary policy, while loans not under commitment do
promptly decline, and argues that the share of loans not under commitments is a useful indicator of
thestance of monetary policy.
6See Carlton (1991) for further discussion; on the relevance oft his for the explanation of nominal
price rigidity, S= Lucas and Woodford (1994) and Diamond (1994), The model of the goods market
used here is closely related to that of Lucas and Wood ford; see the end of section 2.1 for discussion
of the differences.
7This is an oversimplification, but such a “credit channel” is often argued to play an important
role in the transmission mechanism for monetary policy (e.g., Bern~ke and Gertler, 1995).
2different types of consumers as well. 8 Monetary policy is modelled in terms of the
central bank’s SUPPIYof funds to an interbati market, in which commercial banks
finance their lending activity. The optimal policy issue considered concerns the degree
to which the money supply (and, in this model, the volume of bank lending) should be
allowed to vary endogenously in response to the preference shocks, due to the nature
of the central bank’s supply of funds to the interbank market.
The consumer credit market is assumed to be subject to a sequential service
constraint, just as in the case of the goods market. This means that banks enter
into loan supply commitments in advance, that cannot be made contingent upon the
overall state of credit demand. In the model, all loans are made under commitments,
just as all sales of goods are; but borrowers’ differing ex ante characteristics determine
whether they obtain more or less favorable terms. Borrowers who are expected to
borrow only at times of high demand cannot obtain commitments that entitle them to
borrow at a low rate of interest, and it is in this sense that the favorable commitments
obtained by the other borrowers result in these borrowers’ bearing the brunt of the
“credit crunch”. The existence of commtiments with these differential terms is shown
to be an equilibrium phenomenon, in the csse of a central bank policy that seeks to
restrain money growth during times of high demand. On the other hand, a central
bank commitment to interest-rate smoothing (an elastic supply of funds) resdts in
all borrowers obtaining loan commitments on similar terms. Under a certain extreme
specification of the nature of the exogenous uncertainty in the economy, a perfectly
elastic supply of funds can be shown to be optimal.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 gives an overview of the structure of
the model. Section 2 then derives the conditions that characterize the stationary
equilibrium associated with a given monetary policy. Finally, section 3 discusses the




Equilibrium Model of Goods and Loan Sup-
Commitments
In this section, we describe the structure of the model. The economy consists of four
types of agents: households, fires, commercial banks, and a government that operates
a central bank. (The numbers of households and firms are each normalized to one. )
The households negotiate goods supply commitments with the firms and loan supply
commitments with the commercial banks. After a random shock is realized that
determines the current state of aggregate demand, they exercise these commitments to
some degree, borrowing money from the banks and using it to purchase goods from the
firms. The funds that the banks lend out me obtained from deposits from households,
‘It would be more realistic to consider differingdegrees of volatility in the investment spending of
different types of firms, but the mode] is simplified by abstracting from investment and endogenous
productive cap~ity altogether.
3and in an interbank funds market, in which the central bank also participant es. The
monetary policy question ad~essed in the paper concerns the rule to be followed in
the central bank’s supply of funds in this interbank market.
Households are all identical, but each household is made up of a large number of
individual members, each of whom obtains utility from his or her own purchases of
goods. The tastes of the different members of a household differ, and in particular,
are differently Mected by the aggregate state. The members also act independently
during each period, each negotiating individual goods and loan supply commitments,
and making individual decisions to borrow and to purchase goods under those com-
mitments. However, at the end of each period, the separate household members merge
their assets and obligations in a single household budget, and it is only the budget
constraint of the household as a whole that is ultimately binding. It is assumed that
households can in some way induce their members to act so as to maximize a com-
mon objective (average utility of all of the members) subject to the common budget
constraint. This device is introduced (following Lucas, 1990, and Fuerst, 1992) in
order to allow us to retain the simplicity of a representative-household analysis (i.e.,
to avoid having to model the evolution of a wealth distribution) while nonetheless
allowing shocks to have aspetric effects. The same result might equivalently be
obtained (at the expense of additional notation) by allowing atomistic individuals to
insure one another, before learning their “types”, against the (fully diversifiable) risk
of turning out to be a type that is especially adversely tiected in a given state of the
economy. 9
The objective of each household is thus to maximize
where c; denotes the consumption per member of type i in period t. Here ni > 0 is
the fraction of members that are of type i, and 6i(st ) >0 is a time-varying preference
shock that is type-specific; the state of aggregate demand st in period t determines
each person’s current intensity of utility from consumption, but may tiect different
types differentially. (In particular, some types may have more cyclical ~iation in
their desire to consume than others. ) The expectation is over possible histories of
realizations of the states {St}. I assume, for simplicity, that st is independently drawn
each period from the same finite set S = {1, 2, . . . .3}; the probability n~ of a given
state s occurring is the same each period, I assume that states are ordered so that
for each ty-pe i, s’ z s implies that 6i(s’) z 6i(s), This implies that larger values of s
correspond unambiguously to higher levels of demand for current consumption. Fi-
nally, O < ~ < 1 is a constant discount factor, and U(.) is a strictly incre~ing, strictly
concave, continuously differentiable function, defined for all non-negative levels of
consumption.
‘This was shown in the conference draft of this paper, available from the author upon request.
41.1 Sequential Trade
Thesequence ofevents dwingany given period is= follows. Each household begins
the period with nominal wealth in the form of deposits worth D z O with one or
another of the banks. 10 Competition among the banks for these deposits determines
a market-clearing gross nominal interest rate rd for these deposits, payable at the end
of the period. Banks begin with assets and liabilities that consist solely of the funds
D deposited with them by the households. Firms begin with a productive capacity
of y >0 units of a homogeneous, non-durable good. Firms begin the period with no
other assets, ss they distribute their earnings to the households that own them at the
end of each period.
Exchange is assumed to occur each period in two stages. In a first stage, household
members negotiate supply commitments with firms, that are then executed during
the second stage. Simultaneously, household members negotiate loan commitments
with commercial banks. In these negotiations, individual household members each
negotiate their own supply commitments, with the type of each person being public
information, but with neither party yet” knowing the state of aggregate demand s.
Prior to the execution stage, the state s is revealed to buyers, but not to sellers.
Household members then decide to what extent to borrow funds under their loan
commitments, and to what extent to purchase goods under their supply commitments.
Each household member’s demand for the good in the execution stage depends upon
the aggregate state s, insofar as its utility from consumption in the current period
is given by bi(s)u(c). The realization of this shock also determines the degree to
which loan commitments are exercised, as the household members require cash loans
in order to be able to pay cash for the goods that they purchase. 11
The significance of the negotiation stage is that it is assumed that at this stage,
buyers and sellers are able to costlessly negotiate supply contracts in a competitive
environment with full information. On the other hand, once the state s is realized,
it is resumed not to be possible to organize a centralized Walrasian spot market for
the good. Instead, suppliers must be able to fill orders placed by individual buyers
without waiting to learn the state of aggregate demand s. This is the sequential
service constraint refereed to above, 12
Suppliers negotiate in advance the terms under which they will supply goods to
particular buyers, should these buyers present them with orders during the execution
stage. But the supply commitment made to an individual buyer cannot be contingent
101 drop the time subscript in the following discussion, M no ambiguity should be created. Note
that in the stationary equilibrium that is characterized below, quantities such aa D take the same
value in every period.
llHousehold members do not have acce~ to the household’s deposits with the banks in order to
satisfy the c~h-in-advance constraint on their purchases; for interest is paid on these time deposits
exactly because the bank is able to use them to make c~h loans to household members who choose
to draw down their loan commitments.
12The terminology follows Diamond and Dybvig (1983), “who assume a constraint of this kind on
the form of commitment that a financial intermedimy can make with its depositors regarding the
terms of withdrawal.
5upon the purchases made by any other buyers, and so cannot be contingent upon the
aggregate state s. The existence of the negot iat ion stage makes it possible for types
that are more certain of their desire for the good to negotiate a secure supply of the
good on favorable terms (which sellers will grant them, on the basis of their type,
in order to reduce the risk of ending with unused capacity). 13 However, since the
state of demand is not known to sellers, buyers do not have an enforceable obligation
to buy any amount. Rather, a seller is committed to supply any amount demanded
by the buyer, up to a certain quantity limit, at a premranged price schedule, that
may make the supply price depend upon the quantity that the buyer purchases. The
act ual quantity purchased under this commitment, ci(s), remains at the discretion
of the buyer, and will in general depend upon the realization of the state s. Thus
sellers are not able to “sell forward” their output in the negotiation stage, and unused
capacity is possible in equilibrium.
Finally, it is assumed that the supply commitments must indicate the price (if any)
at which each successive additional purchase by a buyer can be made, simply as a
function of the number of units already purchased by that buyer, and not contingent
upon the eventual quantity that the buyer might subsequently purchase. This is
another aspect of the sequential service constraint.
Thus a supply commitment for a buyer of type i takes the form of a quantity
limit Ei and a right-continuous function Pi(.) defined on the interval [0, Zi). Here pi(c)
denotes the price at which the next increment of the good is available to the buyer,
after a quantity c has already been purchased. (The assumption of right-continuity
means that if pi (c) = p, it is possible for some additional positive quantity of the good
to be purchased at an average price that is arbitrarily close to p; in the absence of
this, it would not be meaningful to say that further purch~es are possible at the price
p. Treating purchases w a continuous variable simplifies the analysis of competitive
equilibrium, a.s usual. ) Allowing pi to depend upon the quantity purchased makes it
possible for sellers to raise their prices to some extent in high-demand states, but in
a way that respects the sequential service constraint. Under such a commitment, a
buyer who decides to purchue a quantity c must pay ~(c), where
R(c) = Jcp,(c’)dc’. (1.2)
Firms are assmed to be able to extend only supply commitments that they are
able to fufill. Since the commitment to any one buyer cannot be contingent upon
whether other buyers choose to execute their commitments, this means that the total
number of units of output that a given fim commits itself to supply may not exceed
its productive capacity y. This implies an aggregate feasibility condition of the form
(1.3)
i
lgcarlton Ilgglj give9 exmples of markets in which customers pay more the greater the correlation
between their individual demand and the firm’s aggregate demand. Such a relationship is predicted
by the model developed here.
6The consumer credit market, like the goods market, is assumed to be subject to a
sequential service constraint. This means that during the negotiation stage, household
members also negotiate loan commitments, specified by a quantity limit fii and a
supply function rl (.), indicating the terms upon which that buyer can borrow. Here
~i is the maximum quantity that may be borrowed during the execution stage, and
Ti(M) indicates the interest rate at which the next incremental loan is available, after
a quantity M has already been borrowed. As before, ri (.) is assumed to be a right-
continuous function defined on the interval [0, ~i). The quantity ri (M) is a gross
nominal interest rate on loans of cash, so that if the quantity borrowed is M, the
repayment obligation due at the end of the period is given by Bi (M), where
(1.4)
In the execution stage, each household member decides what quantity of goods
to purchase and what quantity of money to borrow, given the state s that has been
realized. The purchases q(s) and borrowing Mi (s) of a buyer of type i must satisfy
the cash-in-advance constraint
&( G(s)) < ~fi(S). (1.5)
These decisions result in aggregate consumption (and capacity utilization) c(s) s
~i nica(s), aggregate nominal expenditure Y(s) - xi niRi(cl(s)), aggregate borrow-
ing (and transactions balances) M(s) s xi niMi (s), and aggregate repayment obli-
gations to the banks B(s) s ~i ~iBi(A4i(s)).
During the execution stage, firms supply the goods that are demanded, using
their productive capacity. Banks supply the money that household members choose
to borrow, obttining any necessuy funds in excess of the deposits that households
have made with them in a competitive interbank funds market (in which banks with
excess deposits may also lend them out). This market is assumed to be held only
after the execution stage is complete, so that banks have learned their need for funds
to satisfy the transactions needs of their borrowers. We may suppose that during the
execution phase itself, the banks obtain the c~h needed by drawing upon reserves
that they maintain with the central bank. After the execution phase is completed,
however, they are required to replenish these reserves, through the interbank funds
market. (The central bank requires them to hold a certain quantity of reserves,
as of the end of this int erbank trading, but prior to repayment of the households’
loans.) This market is a competitive spot market, ~sumed to involve no sequential
service constraint, w only specialists – the commercial banks and the central bank –
participate in it. The interbank funds market clems at an interest rate p(s), that may
depend upon the state of aggregate demand (as may banks’ need for funds). Because
the funds market is cleared only after completion of the execution phase, this interest
rate does not reveal the state of aggregate demand soon enough for goods or loan
supply commitments to be made contingent upon it,
The fact that reserve requirements must be met (and the funds market clears) only
after completion of the execution stage allows the central bank to vary the supply
7of funds to banks (and hence the SUPPIYof transactions balances) in different states
of aggregate demand. The way in which it should do so is the question of monetmy
policy that we wish to analyze. Monetary policy is described by the central bank’s
supply schedule in the interbank funds market. This can be described by a funds
supply correspondence r, indicating the pairs of int crest rates p and net supplies of
funds F to the commercial banks (net lending by the central bank) that me consistent
wit h the central bad’s policy, Market clearing in the interbank funds market then
requires that M(s) = D + F(s), and hence that
(P(s), M(s) - ~) c r (1.6)
for each state s. The central bank is required to commit itself to a correspondence
r prior to realization of the state of aggregate demand, though the point on this
correspondence that is actually reached a.s the equilibrium of the funds market may
depend upon the realization of s. The reason for restricting attention to monetary
policies of this form is to show that there can exist a non-trivial role for monetary
policy even under the assumption that the central bank h~ no information about
the state of the economy that is superior to that of any private parties. The central
bank’s policy problem then reduces to the question of whether to choose a more or
less elastic funds supply correspondence.
Fina~y, all accounts are settled at the end of the period. Firms distribute their
profits to the households, that own them; since the revenues of fires equal total
expenditure on goods, the amount distributed to the representative household is
simply Y(s). Commercial banks pay households rdD for their deposits, and repay
their loans horn the central bank, in the amount of p(s) ~(s). At the same time,
they receive payments of aggregate value B(s) from their borrowers; the excess of
this amount over their interest obligations represents profits that are distributed to
the households, that own the banks as well. Thus total profits distributed (by fires
and banks) per household at the end of the period are given by
~(s) = y(s)+ [B(s) – p(s)~(s)] + [P(S) – rd]D, (1.7)
Individual household members merge their budgets, pooling any unspent cash (A4i –
~(ci (s)) for e~h member of type i), and assigning to the household responsibility for
their loan repayment obligations to the banks (Bi (Mi(s)) for each member oft ype i).
The government makes net lump-sum transfers to each household in an amount T(s),
that may depend upon the aggregate state; these allow the government to rebate to
the private sector the central bank’s earnings from lending to the commercial banks.
The household’s nominal wealth (held in the form of bank deposits) at the beginning
of the following period then equals
D’(s) = TdD+ ~ni[~a(s) – &(ci(s)) – ~i(~i(s))] + ~(s)+ ~(s), (1.8)
1
where H(s) is given by (1.7). A household is constrained to act so that D’(s) ~ O;
thus all loans are in fact repaid at the end of the period,
8This completes our description of the sequence of events that take place each
period. Trade proceeds in the next period in the same way, beginning with deposits
D’ of households with the commercial banks.
1.2 Optimization and Equilibrium
Now let the maximium attainable level of continuation utility attainable by a house-
hold that begins the next period with deposits D’, in the case that the current ag-
gregate state is s, be denoted v(D’; s). 14 Note that this function may, in general,
be different in the csse of different states s, because the equilibrium in the following
period depends not only upon the wealth D’ carried into the next period by this par-
ticulw household, but also upon the wealth carried into the next period by others,
which may depend upon the state s. 15 lt then follows that the actions {ci(s), ~i(s)}
of the various household members during the execution stage are chosen, given the
aggregate state s, so as to maximize
~~i6i(s)~(~i(s)) + @v(D’(s); S), (1.9)
i
subject to constraint (1,5) for each type i, taking w given that D’(s) depends upon
these decisions in the way indicated by (1.8), and the values of H(s) and T(s).
At the negotiation stage, each firm j enters into supply commitments that imply
state-dependent sales revenues R~(s) that mtimize the expected continuation utility
of its shareholders,
~ T.zJ(D’(s); S) 7 (1.10)
SES
subject to the fe~ibility constraint (that the total number of supply commitments
not exceed its productive capacity y), taking as given that D’(s) depends upon the
firm’s profits in the way indicated by (1,8), and taking as given the state-dependent
variation in all other terms in (1.8). Since an individual firm’s revenues contribute
only negligibly to shareholders’ wealth, this amounts to maximization of
~ n, TJ’(D’(s); s) R~(s), (1.11)
SES
taking as given the value of D’(s) in each possible state. In choosing its supply
commitments, the fim also takes as given the degree to which its customers will
choose to exercise such commitments in each possible state s. These expectations
ldstand~dd~~ic pro=~ing arguments can be A to show existence of such a ~lue funC-
tion, and that it is an increasing, concave function, dtierentiable at the level of wealth that is actually
carried into the next period in equilibrium. The sort of argument that may be used is illustrated
for a related model by Lucas and Woodford (1994).
lsThe exact way in which aggregate outcomes in the state s deterrn,ine the value of individual
wealth in the following period need not be explicitly repre~nted for present purposes, since individual
households will in any event not be able to affect those aggregate outcomes, only the way that their
own wealth D’ varies with s.
9follow from a correct understanding of how household members will behave in order
tom=imize their objective (1.9), amatter treated inmoredetail infection 2.
Similarly, each bank k enters into loan commitments that maximize the expected
value of its profits to its shareholders, which amounts to mtimization of
x ~g~’(~’(s); s)[~k(s) -P(S) M’(S) + (p(s) - T’)D’]. (1.12)
9ES
Here M~(s) and B~(s) denote the total amount of money borrowed from bank k
and the total amount that households must repay at the end of the period as a
result; each of these depends upon the loan commitments entered into by the bank at
the negotiation stage, and upon the state-dependent behavior of household members
during the execution ph=e. The bank also chooses the quantity of deposits Dk to bid
for at the beginning of the period so as to maximize (1.12), given the market interest
rate T’ and its expectations regarding the state-dependent interbank rate {p(s)}.
It then follows that, given initial household wealth D, a stat~dependent value
function {v(.; s)} and expected stat~contingent government transfers {Z’(s)}, a tem-
porary eqw”libriumconsists of an interest rater’ for deposits, a specification of goods
and loan supply commitments (G, pi(.); ~i, ~i(.)) for each type z, stat~contingent
consumption and borrowing plans {q(s), Mi (s)} for each type, a state-contingent
interbank funds rate {p(s)}, statecontingent profit distributions {H(s)}, and state-








given r’, {p(s) }, and {D’(s)}, the total demmd for deposits on the part of banks
equals the supply of deposits D;
goods supply commitments mtimize (1.11) for each firm subject to its ca-
pacity constraint, given {D’(s) } and the state-contingent spending behavior of
household members;
loan commitments maximize (1. 12) for each bank, given {D’(s), p(s)} and the
statecontingent borrowing behavior of household members;
for each type + and euh state s, (ci(s), Mi(s)) maximize (1.9). subject to (1.5)
and (1.8), given r’, H(s), 2’(s), and the spending and borrowing decisions of the
other types;
in emh state s, p(s) and the {Mi(s)} satisfy (1.6); and
in each state s, E(s) is given by (1.7) and D’(s) by (1.8).
an ensemble describes equilibrium within a given period, taking w given the
predetermined state variable D through which past events affect current conditions,
and tding as given the expectations about future conditions that are relevant for
current decision-making (summarized by the value function v(.; s)).
A full intertemporai equilibrium is a sequence of specifications of D, {v(.; s)}, and
an associated temporary equilibrium for each period, that in addition are such that
10(a) in each period, the initial wealth D is the value that results from (1.8) in the
tempor~y equilibrium of the previous period; and
(b) in eah period, and for each state s, the value function V(C;s) represents the
maximum value of (1.9) that a household would be able to obtain in the tem-
porary equilibrium of the following period, for any level of wealth that it may
carry into that period.
Here we shall restrict our attention to the special case of a stationa~ equilibrium,
in which D, {v(.; s) } are the same each period, and similfily all other aspects of the
temporary equilibria each period. Such an equilibrium is possible in the case of a
monetary policy rule (described by the funds supply correspondence r) that is the
same each period, and a fiscal policy rule such that
T(s) = (p(s) – I)(M(s) -D) (1.13)
at all times, i.e., one in which the government rebates to households the interest
earned on its lending to the banks in the interbank funds market. Substitution of
this into (1.8), using (1.7), implies that D’(s) = D regardless of the state s that
is realized. In this case, the nominal value of deposits held by each household in
equilibrium never changes over time. It is then natural to consider the possibility of
an equilibrium in which prices and interest rates are similarly unchanged over time.
from here on, we consider only equilibria of this kind, and furthermore assume that
the constant level of deposits D is positive, so that the lower bound on end-of-period
wealth never binds in equilibrium.
Stationarity has an important consequence, apart from the fact that each of equa-
tions (1.2) – (1.13) applies equally to every period. This is that the shadow value to
households of additional end-of-period wealth, v’(D’; s), is the same in all states s.
Let us write v >0 for this common value. This allows simplification of expressions
(1.11) and (1.12); the objective of both firms and banks turns out to be simply the
maximization of expected profits.
2 Characterization of Stationary Equilibrium
We now turn to a more detailed characterization of stationary equilibrium in the
model of the previous section. We sha~ proceed in stages, describing first the equi-
librium supply behavior of fires without reference to the specific character of the
stochastic variations in demand that occur, and only subsequently considering the
consequences of the kind of taste shocks assumed in (1.1).
2.1 Equilibrium Supply Commitments with Uncertain De-
mand
Competitive equilibrium in the market for supply contracts at the negotiation stage
results in the existence of a single quantity limit ~i and a single equilibrium supply
11function pi(.) for each type i. We assume that there is competition between fires
to supply the next increment of the good purchased by any buyer of type z who has
already purchased quantity c (for any O s c < ~i); then pi(c) is the market-clearing
price for such commitments. The analysis is simplified if we assume that a firm is
unable to distinguish whether the buyer obtaining an incremental commitment has
obtained his prior supply commitment from the same seller or from someone else, and
is similarly unable to observe the terms oft he buyer’s prior supply commitments; but
it is assumed that a seller can verify the total quantity already purchased at the time
that the buyer places an order under the commitment. Then there is clearly a single
market-clearing price depending only upon the type z and the previously purchased
quantity c. The equilibrium quantity limit z represents the lowest quantity such that
no seller is willing to offer further commitments to buyers of type i who have already
purchased that amount of the good.
In the negotiation stage, buyers of type i voluntarily accept price commitments up
to the quantit y limit ~, of the form indicated by the equilibrium supply function pi (c).
(Since buyers are not obligated to make any purchases, there is no resson not to keep
accepting incremental commitments, at the lowest prices at which they are available. )
Firms choose the quantity of commitments that they wish to make to buyers of each
type, at the competitive prices for each possible type of incremental commitment.
Equilibrium requires that fires choose to supply exactly the quantity of commitments
that buyers demand, which is to say exactly one full commitment (allowing purchases
up to ~) per buyer of type i. In addition, equilibrium requires that no firm be willing
to offer incremental commitments at prices lower than the equilibrium prices, or be
willing to offer incremental commitments beyond the equilibrium quantity limit ~i at
any finite price.
In the execution stage, each buyer of type i decides what quantity O < Ci < ~i to
purchase, given the state s that is realized. The purchasing decision ci(s) depends
upon the commitment (~, pi(. )) obtained during the negotiation stage. Rational
anticipation of this decision, in turn, determines the willingness of fires to extend
such commitments during the negotiation stage. Individual fires take as given the
equilibrium values {G(s) }, just M they do the equilibrium supply terms {Zi,pi (.)}, in
deciding which supply commitments to offer, Expected revenues per unit of capacity
committed, in the cue of incremental supply commitments to buyers of type i who
have already purch~ed quantity c, are equal to
where 1(z) is the function whose value is 1 if statement z is true, and Ootherwise.
A supply commitment to a given buyer can be made only if it is fewible for the
firm to honor the commitment with certainty. It follows that optimization by a firm
requires that each unit of capacity be committed in the way that yields the highest
expected revenues. As in equilibrium it is necessary that supply commitments be
12made to each type of buyer, up to the quantity limit Zi, it follows that one must have
Pa(c) ~m,l(ci(s) > c) = A
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(2.1)
for each i and each O s c < Zi. Here Aindicates the m=imum available expected rev-
enues per unit of capacity. Furthermore, if A > 0, optimization by a firm requires that
all capacity be committed. (We assume that the same communication barriers during
the execution stage that prevent organization of a centralized market also preclude
purchases from being made other than under previously negotiated commitments. )
Thus equilibrium requires that if A >0, (1.3) holds with equality.
But equilibrium in the negotiation stage requires more than mere indifference on
the part of firms between the various types of supply commitments that are actually
offered in equilibrium; fires must also be content not to offer any of those that me not
offered in equilibrium: There is plainly no point in a firm’s offering an incremental
supply commitment to buyers of type z after a quantity c has been purchased at a
price p > pi(c), since no buyer will accept such a commitment, given the availability
of supply commitments at a lower price. In the case of a quantity c such that in
every state, either q(s) < c or Ci(s) > c, there is equally plainly no point in offering
an incremental supply commitment at a price p < pi(c). For in states s in which
ci(s) < c without the price reduction, the incremental commitment will not be drawn
upon despite the lower price, while in states s in which ci(s) > c without the price
reduction, it would be drawn upon even if the price were pi(c). Hence such a price
reduction can only reduce expected revenues per unit of capacity so committed.
A more complex case is that of a quantity c such that cl(s) = c for some state
s. This means that at the equilibrium incremental supply price pi(c), buyers choose
not to draw upon the commitment in state s, However, it may be that they would
purch~e more in state s in the case of an incremental supply commitment at some
lower price, and so we must consider whether a fim could increase expected revenues
by offering such a commitment. Consideration of this requires that we specify what
firms expect about whether additional commitments, not offered in equilibrium, would
be draw-n upon in various states. Given the equilibrium commitment (Zi,pi(.)), the
determinants of type i demand (further specified in the next section) determine not
only the quint ity G(s) that is purch~ed in state s under that commitment, but
also the lowest price pi(s) at which type i would be willing to buy an additional
positive quantity, after having purchased ci(s) under the equilibrium commitment.
(Technically, we shall use pi(s) to denote the greatest lower bound of the set of such
prices. ) An incremental commitment to buyers of type i after purchases of a quantity
c at a price p s pi(c) will thus be accepted by such buyers in the negotiation stage,
and drawn upon in the execution stage with probability
~ ~~[l(C~(S) > C)+ l(C~(S) = C)l(@~(S)> p)].
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(Note that this reduces to ~, n~l(G(S) > c), a assumed in
P = pi (c), for one must have Pi(s) s Pi(ci(s)) in every state.)
(2.1), in the c~e that
13Expected revenues per unit of capacity committed under incremental commit-
ments of this knd me just p times this probability. It follows that a further require-
ment for equilibrium is that
~~T,[I(Ci(S) > C) + I(C~(S) = C)I(jj(S) > p)]< A (2.2)
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for all types i and all prices p s pi(c), in the cwe of my quantity O < c < ~i.
Furthermore, condition (2.2) must hold for all types i and all prices p, in the case
that c = ~i; for only if this is so will fires not wish to increase the quantity limit G.
Conditions (2. 1) - (2.2), together with the requirement that (1.3) hold with equal-
ity, determine the equilibrium supply commitments {Zi,pi (.)}, given a specification
of the determinants of buyer demand in each state s. Detailed characterization of
such an equilibrium is not possible without further analysis of buyer behavior. Still,
several observations are already possible as to the nature of ag~egate supply.
It is shown below that for each buyer type i, if s’ 2 s, then q(s’) z Ci(s); and if
C1(S’)= ci(s), then fii(s’) z ii(s). Thus higher s corresponds to a state of uniformly
higher demand. Then it follows from (2.1) that each equilibrium supply schedule pi (.)
is a non-decreasing, piecewise constant function, of the form
Pi(c) = P9 for all C~(S– 1) SC <&(S) (2.3)






for each state s’. In the case that A > 0, this is an incre~ing sequence of positive
prices. (It is shown below that this is the only possible type of equilibrium. ) Note
that these prices are the same for all types i. Condition (2.1) also implies that for any
c < Ei, there exists a state in which ci(s) > c, so that G = G(3). Thus (2.3) specifies
pi(. ) over its entire domain [0, G).
Condition (2.3) implies that every order that is plmed if and ordy if a state s’ a s
occurs is made at the same price p~, regardless of the buyer’s type. If we rank orders
so that orders that are placed in a larger number of states have an earlier rank, then
the price associated with each order is a function solely of its rank (independent of the
type of buyer). This price is given by an aggregate supply schedule p(-), a function
defied on [0,y), such that p(c) is the next price at which orders are placed when
aggregate purchases in excess of c are made. Conditions (2.3)–(2.4) imply that p(. ) is
a non-decrewing, piecewise constant function, of the form (2.3), but with thresholds
defined by the successive quantities {c(s)}.
It is now apparent that unexpected variations in the nominal value of aggregate
spending – unexpected, that is, relative to information available during the negotia-
tion stage – must be associated with variations in capacity utilization. For aggregate
spending is given by Y(s) = R(c(s)), where R(-) is the integral of p(.) as in (1.2).
14This implies that if Y(s’) > Y(s), one must have c(s’) > c(s) as well, so that the
fraction of total capacity y that is unwed must be lower in state s’.
The way in which unexpected variations in aggregate spending result in variations
in capacity utilization here is essentially the same as in the superficially dissimilar
models of Lucas and Woodford (1994) and Eden (1994), even tbough those mod-
els ~sume a different ultimate source for the variations in aggregate spending (i.e.,
stochastic monetary policy). In the model of Lucas and Woodford, a sequential ser-
vice constraint similar to that imposed here is assumed, though there are no supply
commitments made in advance to particular buyers, and buyers simply place orders
with sellers when they find one willing to supply them at a low enough price. The
equilibrium relations linking the state of demand, transactions prices, and quantities
purchased are the same = those derived here; the model of aggregate supply set out
in this section is essentially equivalent to theirs in the case that all buyers are of a
single type.
In Eden’s model, there is a sequence of competitive spot markets, one before
anything is known about the state of demand, another after it is revealed that the
lowest-demand state h= not occurred (if it has not), and so on. The number of
markets that occur is greater the higher the state of demand. The sequence of prices
{p,} derived above corresponds, in Eden’s model, to the market-clearing prices in this
succession of spot markets, when they occur. Again, the equilibrium relations linking
the state of demand, transactions prices, and quantities purchased are the same as
are derived here.
An advantage of the formalism introduced here, relative to either of the variants
just discussed, is that the distinct transactions prices {p, } are not represented as
relating to purchmes that occur in any particular temporal order. Thus the present
model predicts that one should in general observe a non-degenerate distribution of
prices at which similar goods are simultaneously offered for sale, w one does. But
it does not predict that, say, all similar goods sold on Monday at 10 a.m. should
sell for the same price, but that this price should be lower than the price for which
goods of this type me sold on Monday at 2 p.m.-a prediction of the earlier models, if
taken literally, that is certainly not verified in reality. The present formalism is also
convenient, for present purposes, in that it provides a clear reason for buyers whose
demands are cyclical to wing degrees to face different supply prices; this effect (for
which there is empirical support) turns out to be important for the welfare analysis
of alternative monetary policies.
2.2 Monetary Policy and Equilibrium Loan Commitments
The form of equilibrium loan commitments can be characterized along lines similar
to those of the previous subsection, again deferring a complete analysis of the extent
to which such commitments will be exercised in different aggregate states, The main
difference in the analysis in the case of the consum”er credit market is that there is no
analog here of fires’ capacity constraint; instead, a bank that extends an additional
15commitment simply understands that it must borrow funds in the interbank market,
in those states in which the commitment is actually exercised. ,Monetuy policy, by
determining the state-dependent interest rate at which such funds will be available,
is thus a crucial determinant of the form of equilibrium loan commitments.
As explained in section 1, monetary policy is described by a funds supply corre-
spondence r, indicating the pairs of interest rates p and net supplies of funds F that
are consist ent with the central bank’s supply rule. (Because of (1.6), this is equiva-
lent to a rule that determines the money supply as a function of the interest rate in
the interbank market. ) This correspondence is a non-empty subset of the Euclidean
plane, ~sumed to satisfy the following properties:
(i) if (p, F), (p’, F’) c r, and p’ > p, then F’ 2 F; similuly, if F’ > F, then p’ 2p;
and
(ii) for any (p, F) G r, there exists another point (p’, F’)cr,withp’>p,F’2 F,
and at least one inequality strict; similarly, there exists another point (p’, F’) G
r, with p’ < p, F’ s F, and at least one inequality strict.
Condition (i) is a weak monotonicity requirement; alternative monetary policies thus
amount to dfierent decisions as to how rapidly or slowly interest rates will be allowed
to rise in the interbank market in response to an increase in the net demud for
funds. Condition (ii) implies that the correspondence gives a complete description
of the central bank’s stance in the face of an arbitrarily high or low net demand for
funds.
It is useful to distinguish between two possible classes of policies, that I shall call
direct and zndirect monet~ policies. Under a direct policy, the central bank directly
controls the volume of credit extended to households by banks, and hence the money
supply, whereas under an indirect policy the central bank restricts itself to control
simply of the supply of funds to banks in the interbank market. In terms of the for-
malism just introduced, a direct policy corresponds to the choice of a correspondence
~ with properties (i) – (ii), whereas in the case of an indirect policy the funds supply
correspondence must satis~ an additional property:
(iii) if (p, F) G r, p >1. —
Condition (iii) must be satisfied in the cme of an indirect policy, because if the central
bank does not monitor the lending of the banks, then it cannot prevent them, in the
case of a negative interest rate in the interbank market (p < 1), from borrowing
an arbitrmily large quantity of funds and simply holding them rather than lending
them out. Hence equilibrium in the interbank market cannot involve an interest rate
less than p = 1, and we can represent this as a constraint on the possible supply
correspondences of the central bank (in which case we need not introduce notation
for a distinction between the quantity that banks loan and the quantity that they
borrow in the interbank market). In the case of a direct policy, by contrsst, the
central bank can provide incentives for banks to actually lend, and not simply to
16borrow from the central bank, and so equilibria are possible with negative interest
rates in the interbad market. Thus the clsss of possible indirect policies is a proper
subset of the class of possible direct policies.
We turn now to the characterization of equilibrium interest rates and the equi-
librium supply of loan commitments, given such a policy. Maximization of expected
profits by banks in their bidding for deposits at the beginning of the period, together
wit h households’ supply of deposits in the quantity D > 0, implies that this market
clears if and only if
,’= ~7r,p(s). (2.5)
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Similarly, maximization of expected profits implies that in the negotiation stage, any
bank will be willing to supply incremental loan commitments at an interest rate
equal to the expected value of p(s) in the interbank market, conditional upon the
loan commitment’s being drawn upon. Thus each loan supply schedule ~i(.) must
satisfy
(2.6)
for all O ~ M < Mi(~). We may without loss of generality assume that banks do
not bother to offer commitments that they know will never be drawn upon, so that
~i = A4i(E) for each i. Then (2.6) deties ri (“) over its entire domain.
Another necessmy condition for equilibrium in the credit market cluing the ne-
gotiation stage is that ri(M) z 1 over the entire domain of the function. In the case
of an indirect monet~ policy, this follows from (2.6). However, it is necessq for
equilibrium even if negative interest rates are possible in the interbank market. This
is because no bank could expect to gain by offering an incremental loan commitment
at an interest rate r < 1, rather than some other rate T’ with r < r’ < 1. For a buyer
with either commitment will draw upon it with certainty, in any state in which he
borrows quantity M and thus becomes eligible to do so. (The money thus borrowed
need not be spent; part could simply be held in order to repay the loan at the end
of the period. ) Furthermore, there is no possibilityy that competition between banks
could force them to offer commitments at the rate r. For if other banks offer incre-
mental commitments at that rate, a bank can offer its own commitment at the rate r’,
to apply after the borrower hu aheady borrowed M’, where M’ – M is the quantity
of commitments obttined at the lower interest rate. Such an incremental commit-
ment will still be accepted (W it does not preclude acceptance of the lower-rate loan
commitments first ), and it is exercised in the same states as the other ones (since
whenever the buyer borrows M, he will borrow M’, given the negative cost of the
additional borrowing); therefore it results in higher expected revenues. This conclu-
sion does not contradict the necessity of (2.6); it simply means that the equilibrium
interest rates in the interbank market must be such that the right hand side of (2.6)
is never lower than 1, lest an arbitrage opportunity be created for banks.
It is shown in the next subsection that {Mi (s)} is a non-decreasing series. It then
follows from (2,6) that each equilibrium loan supply schedule is a piecewise constant
17function, of the form
for all A4~(s– 1) < M < Mi(s) (2.7)
for each state s such that Mi(s) > Ma(s – 1), where M,(O) s O. The sequence of
interest rates {r, } referred to in (2.7) is given by
(2.8)
Furthermore, aggregate borrowing {M(s) } is also a non-decreming series. Given
the monotonicity assumption on r (condition (i) above), this implies that the series
{p(s)} must be non-decreasing, except possibly in the case of successive states over
which M(s) remains constant, at a value corresponding to a vertical segment of the
correspondence r. We shall impose as a further regularity condition on equilibria
that {p(s) } be a non-decreasing series in such a c~e M well. (This amounts to con-
sideration only of equilibria that can be approximated arbitrarily closely by equilibria
associated with monetary policies which make the money supply a well-defined, in-
cre~ing function of p.) Then (2.8) implies that the series {r, } is non-decreasing M
well. Finally, comparison of (2,8) with (2.5) indicates that rl = rd, so that ri (M) z Td
for all i and all M ~ O.
As in the analysis above of goods supply commitments, optimization again requires
also that expected profits be non-positive in the c=e of all loan commitments that
are not offered in equilibrium. We can strengthen the requirements for equilibrium,
by demanding not merely that no fim wish to offer any other supply commitments
given the equilibrium loan commitments, and that no bh wish to offer any other loan
commitments given the equilibrium supply commitments of sellers, but furthermore
that there be no joint deviation by a firm and a bank that wodd be jointly profitable.
16 Note that it stices to consider the condition under which the combination of an
incremental goods supply commitment and an incremental loan commitment would
induce an increase in the goods purchased in some state, and a corresponding increme
in the money borrowed to pay for those additional purchases. For the only case in
which a borrower could be induced to borrow additional funds in some state and not
use them for increased purchases is if the interest rate for the incremental borrowing
is zero (r = 1). Such an incremental loan would only create positive expected profits
for the lender if at the level of borrowing M at which the incremental loan is offered,
But this would violate the necessary condition for equilibrium already stated above,
that the right hand side of (2.6) be no less than 1 for any M.
16This amounts to a refinement of our equilibrium concept, that allows for mutually beneficial
coordination of the supply behavior of more than one entity, as long as such coalitions never involve
a non-negligible fraction of the suppliers in any market.
18It has been shown in the next subsection that a household member of type i would
make use of an incremental SUpply commitment beyond the point c = ci(s) and an
incremental loan commitment beyond the point M = m (ci(s) ), in state s, if and
only if the incremental SUpply price p and the incremental interest rate T are such
that p < pi(c), ~ S ~i(~), and p < @i(s), for a certain threshold &i(s) that is there
characterized. For present purposes, it suffices to note that
@i(S) < pi(Ci(S))~i(~(Ci (S))). (2.9)
In fact, the threshold price @i(s) referred to in (2.2) is derivable from this threshold,
through the relation
#~(S) = tl(S)/~~(~(C~(S))). (2.10)
It is then a requirement for equilibrium that for each type i, and for any quantity
O< c < ~i, there exists no price p S p;(c) and interest rate r S ri(~(c)) such that
and
~~.(r - ~(s)) [~(ci(s) > c) + ~(ci(s) = c)~(~i(s) > w)] 20, (2.12)
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unless both (2. 11) – (2.12) hold with equality. For if such a pair (p, r) were to exist,
it would represent a joint incremental commitment that would increase the expected
profits of at least one party (the firm or the bank), without reducing the expected
profits of the other. Similuly, in the cwe that c = - G, there must exist no pair (p, r)
that satisfy (2.11) – (2.12), unless both hold with equality.
Note that in the case that c = ci(s) and r = ri(~(c)), the left hand side of (2.12)
is equal to zero when p = pi(c), using (2.6) and (2.9). It theri follows that (2.12)
holds for all p s pi(c). Hence for this choice of r, there must exist no p s pi(c) for
which (2. 11) holds, unless it holds with equality. But, using (2.10), this requirement
is seen to be equivalent to (2.2). Thus requirements (2.11) – (2.12) imply (2,2), and
can be regarded u an extension of the previous requirement.
Now in the case that c does not equal cl(s) for any state s, requirements (2.11) -
(2.12) are implied by (2.3) - (2.4) and (2.7) - (2.8). If c = Ci(s) for some state s, one
can show that the requirements are satisfied if and only if
for emh state s such that s = 1, or that ci(s) > ci(s – 1), or that G(S) = ci(s – 1)
but ~i(s) > @i(S– l)).
Furthermore, the fact that (2.7) holds for all states in the cl~ses just listed implies
that it must hold for all states. For in the case of any sequence of states (s’, . . . . s’+ j)
such that ci(s’ + k) = ~(s’) ~d @i(s’+ k) = &i(s’) for all O ~ k s j, (2.7) must hold
for state s’ ~ long as s’ – 1 does not also have the same property. But then the
fact that series {p,} and {r,} are both non-decreasing implies that (2.7) holds as
19well for each of the states (s’, . . . . s’ + j). Thus (2.7) must hold for all states. This
provides a complete charwterization of equilibrium loan supply commitments (once
the quantities {Mi(s) } are determined), analogous to that provided by (2.4) in the
case of goods supply commitments.
2.3 Preference Shocks, Spending and Borrowing
Household spending and borrowing decisions in the execution phase remain to be
characterized. These depend upon the state s because such states differ with respect
to the population distribution of preferences for current consumption; this dependence
is the source of the stochastic variations in aggregate demand to which monetary
policy may be more or less accommodative,
As explained in section 1, the household’s problem is to maximize (1.9) subject to
(1.5) and (1.8), given the value function v(.; s) and the value of rdD + H(s) + T(s).
Note that for any household member oft ype i, consumption purchases c are feasible
if and only if O s c s G, O < ~(c) s fi-~. The feasible range is thus [0, ci*], where
ci* = Ei if ~i ~ ~ (Zi), and ci* = R,-l (~i) otherwise. NOW let Ei(c) denote the
total cost for type z of purch~ing a quantity c, counting both the direct cost of
the purchsses and the interest paid for the cash borrowed to make the purchases,
given the supply commitments obtained during the negotiation stage, assuming that
the quantity of cash borrowed is chosen so as to minimize this cost, consistent with
satisfaction of the cash-in-advance constraint. Then the household’s problem reduces
to the choice of {q(s)} so as to mtimize (1.9) subject to the budget constraint
D’(S) = TdD+ ~(S) + T(S) – ~ niEi(ci(s)). (2.14)
i
We have shown in the previous subsections that (pi(.), ri (.)) are both non-decreasing
functions over their respective domains, with pi(c) >0 for all c and ri(M) 21 for all
M. It follows that Ei(c) = Bi(~ (c)), and that this is an incre~ing, convex function
on the domain [0, G*], with Ei(0) = O. Maximization of (1.9) subject to (2.14) then




for each i, where dEi denotes the subdifferential of Ei(.) (Rockafellar (1970)). That
is, for any O ~ Z ~ G*,
It is evident that (3Eiis a non-decreasing, closed and convex-valued, upper-hemicontinuous
correspondence, such that O E ~Ei(0), that O @ ~Ei(c) for any c > 0, and that
SUP~E~(C1*) = ~. It then follows (given the monotonicity and concavity of u(.)
and V(,; s), and strict concavity of U(.)) that (2.15) is satisfied by exactly one set of
consumption plans {C~(s)}.
20In the case of a stationary equilibrium, we furthermore must have the same value
~’(D’(s); s) = v >0 in each state s, as explained at the end of section 1. Then (2.15)
reduces to
(’V) -1 f5,(S)~’(C,(s)) E d~l(ci(s))! (2.16)
for each i. This relation plainly suffices to uniquely determine ci(s), given v (that
remains to be determined) and the goods and loan supply commitments for type z
(the determination of which were treated in the previous two subsections). Condition
(2. 16) indicates how each household’s demand depends upon its type and the state s
that is realized. It follows from this (and the monotonicity of u’ and ~Ei) that a state
with a higher va,lue of 6i(s) must result in a higher value of c,(s). Hence the weak
monotonicit y of 6i(s) in s implies that ci(s) is also non-decreasing in s, as asserted
earlier.
Optimal borrowing then must satisfy the cash-in-advance constraint (1.5), t~
gether with the complementary slmkness condition
[Ti(&(Ci(S))) - l][M,(S) - &(~(S))] = O.
In the event that ~i(M) >1 for all M (as we shall show is always true in a stationary
equilibrium), this implies that
M,(S) = &(~(S)), (2.17)
so that Mi (s) is uniquely determined as well. Because c1(s) is non-decreasing in s,
(2,17) implies that A4i(s) is also non-decreasing in s, as asserted earlier.
These relations determine households, state-contingent spending and borrowing,
given the supply commitments offered by fires and banks. However, ~ noted earlier,
equilibrium supply behavior depends upon suppliers’ understanding of the conditions
under which household members would make use of additional supply commitments
(not actually offered them in equilibrium). It remains to specify this aspect of house
hold behavior.
Consider a household member of type zin the case of states. Given the equilibrium
supply commitments, the buyer chooses to purchase c;(s). It is evident from (2.16),
however, that the buyer would have made use of an incremental supply commitment
beyond this point, had additional goods been available beyond the quantity ci(s) at
a price p, a,nd loans been available beyond the quantity & (ci(s) ) at an interest rate
r, such that pr < &i(s), where
#i(S) = (@.U)-16(S; 2) U’(Ci(S)). (2.18)
Note that (2,16) implies that Zi(s) G dEi(ci(s)), tid hence that ~i(s) satisfies (2.9),
as a,sserted earlier. If we take u given the loan commitments, and consider only
incentives to deviate from the equilibrium supply commitments on the part of fires
(as in the section 2. 1),then an incremental supply commitment beyond the quantity
ci(s) at a price p would be made use of in state s if and only if p < ji(s)l where pi(s)
is defined by (2.10). Note that (2.9) – (2.10) imply that pi(s) s pi(~), as asserted
21earlier. Furthermore, if s’ z s and G(s’) = ci(s), then given (2.10), (2.18) implies
that @i(s’) z Pi(s), M asserted earlier.
It is now also possible to dispose of the possibility of equilibrium in which (2.4)
holds with A = O. Let us assume that for each type i, there exists a state s for
which 6i(s) >0, and let gi be the lowest such state. (There is no loss of generality in
ignoring types that never need to consume. ) The assumption of weak monotonicit y
of hi(s) in s implies that 6i(s) >0 for all s z ~i. Then (2.18) implies that @i(s) >0
for all s a ~i. But if A = O, (2.4) would imply that the right hand side of (2.13)
equals zero for all s, so that (2.13) would be violated in the states just mentioned.
Thus equilibrium necessarily involves A >0, as asserted earlier.
Finally, the shadow value of end-of-period wealth, v, remains to be determined.
Because the constraint D’(s) z O does not bind in any state, the envelope theorem
implies that 17
ti[(D,+~) = pEt{T!+,v;+l(Dt+ 2(st+l); St+l)} (2.19)
at each date t. In a st ation~ equilibrium, (2.19) reduces to rd = ~– 1, which, because
of (2.5), implies that
~m,p(s) = p-’. (2.20)
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This condition turns out not to imply any direct restriction upon the stationary
value of v. However, it does supply an additional condition that must be satisfied
in a stationary equilibrium, and since the considerations taken up earlier already
sufEced to determine the stationary values of all other quantities given the value of
v, condition (2.20) then determines the equilibrium due of v.
2.4 Stationary Equilibrium
Let us now consider the equilibrium that results from joint satisfaction of the various
conditions derived in the preceding subsections. Using the characterizations (2.3) –
(2.4) and (2.7) - (2.8) of equilibrium supply commitments, (2.16) becomes
where for each state s, s-(s) denotes the lowest state s’ for which ci(s’) = ci(s),
and s+(s) denotes the immediate successor to the highest state s’ with this property.
(If there is no higher state for which the property does not hold, then the second
inequality in (2.21) is vacuous. Also, the fist inequality does not apply if Ci(s) = O.)
Substitution of (2.18) into (2.13) and comparison with (2.21) shows that the upper
bound in (2.21) can be tightened, to yield
P9-(9)TS-(J) < “(~v)–L6i(s)u’( ci(s)) < pSrS! (2.22)
where the first inequality again must hold only if ci(s) > 0, (Note that pgr~ cannot
exceed p,+(,)r,+(,), because of the monotonicity of the series {p.} and {r.}.)
171n writing (2.19) we suppress the arguments indicating the possible dependence of the various
quantitim upon the ~istory of a~regate demand statea in periods t and earlier.
22It follows from (2.21) (or equivalently, (2.22)) that in any state s < ~i, so that
6,(s) = O, one must have q(s) = O. (Note that (2.4) and (2.8) imply that p~r. >0 in
all states, given that A > O.) It is also necessary that ci(s) z ci(s – 1) for all s ~ Si
(where in the case s = 1, we again define c~(0) = O). If ci(s) > ci(s – 1), s-(s) = s,
and (2.22) implies that
~’(Ci(S)) = ~V61(S)–lp$~~.
On the other hand, if the second inequality in (2. 11) is strict, one must haves > s-(s),
so that one must have ci(s) = ci(s – 1), and hence u’(ci(s)) = u’(ci(s – l)). Thus for
alls~~,
~’(~(s)) = min[u’(ci(s – 1), ~~6i(s)–lp~~~]J
from which it follows that
(2.23)
Given sequences {p,, r, } and a value v >0, (2.23) uniquely determines the sequence
{Ci(S)}.
“Wemay now collect our results characterizing stationary equilibrium. A stationary
equilibrium is a set of three non-decreasing price series {p3, r~,p(s)}, a pair of non-









given A >0, the prices {p,} are given by (2.4);
given the interbd market rates {p(s)}, the credit market rates {r, } are given
by (2.8);
given the prices {p., r,} and v > 0, the consumption plans {q(s)} are given
by (2.23), together with the requirement that ci(s) = O for all s < A, and the
borrowing plans {Mi(s) } are given by (2.17), where the function ~() is defined
by (1.2) and (2.3);
given the plans {q(s), Mi (s)}, the quantity limits {G, fii} we given by ci(~)
and Mi (3) respectively;
the quantity limits {G} satisfy (1.3);
the interbank mmket rates {p(s)} and the plans {Mi (s)} are such that (1.6) is
satisfied for each state s, where M(s) = ~i Mi(s); and
the interbank market rates {p(s)} satisfy (2.20).
For arbitmily chosen values for A,v > 0 and an arbitary series p = {p(s)},
conditions (i) – (iv) indicate how one may compute unique equilibrium values for
the aggregate supply commitment E s ~i ni~, the expected interbank interest rate
23F ~ ~, ~~P(s), and ag~egate borrowing
(A, v, p) describe a stationary equilibrium
C(A,v,
M(s) in each state. Then such values for
if and only if
P) = Y, (2.24a)
P(P) =P-l, (2.24b)
and
(P(~)) ~(~;~, V,p) - D) c r (2.24c)
for each states. Then~ber ofindependent equihbrium conditions in(2.24) is equal
to the number of endogenous variables (A, v, p). This does not in itself prove that
equilibrium is either possible or uniquely determined in the case of any particular
monetmy policy I’, but should suggest that the proposed definition of equilibrium
satisfies at least minimal standards of coherence. Rather than pursue further ques-
tions of existence or uniqueness of stationary equilibrium for general policies, we turn
instead to the question of the policies that support desirable equilibria.
3 Optimal Monetary Policy: Two Polar Cases
We now turn to the question of optimal monetary policy. An obvious welfme criterion
in the present context is the ez ante expected utility of the representative household.
In a stationary equilibrium of the kind described above, this is proportional to the
quantity
w = ~ ~ m,nibi(s)~(ci(s)). (3.1)
I thus wish to compme the level of W obtained in the alternative stationary equilibria
associated with alternative possible central bank supply correspondences r.
Two opposing considerations can each be brought clearly into focus if we consider
two polar cues in which the optimal policy h~ a simple characterization. The first
polar case is that in which
for each type i and state s, for {ql} a set of positive weights and {6(s)} m increasing,
positive series. In this case, different states s involve no change in the relative inten-
sities of difFerent types’ tastes for current consumption, only uniform variation in all
types’ intensity of desire. We may say in this case that the demand fluctuations are
entirely on the intensive margin. An opposing case is that in which
where again {~i} is a set of positive weights, and where now for each state s, there
exists at least one type i for which ~ = s, In this contrasting extreme case, preferences
are the same, for any given type, across all the states in which that type desires to
consume at all; what varies across states is the number of types with any desire to
24consume. We may say in this c~e that the demand fluctuations are entirely on the
extensive margin.
In characterizing optimal policy in these cases, it is useful to begin by considering
what the optimal state-contingent allocation of resources is like, and then asking if
any monetary policy is consistent with it. Clearly, any feasible allocation of resources
must satisfy the constraint
~naci(s) s Y (3.4)
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in each state s. Let us call the allocation {Ci(S)} that” maximizes (3.1) subject to
(3.4) holding in all states the first-best allocation. This is equivalent to choosing the
allocation in each state to mtimize ~i ni6i(s)~(ci(s)) subject to (3.4) in that state.
Ignoring the case of corner solutions, the solution is characterized by the first-order
conditions
6~(S)~’(~(S)) = ~(S) (3.5)
for all i, where a(s) > 0 is determined by the requirement that (3.4) hold with
equality.
This allocation will, however, seldom be achievable through any monetary policy.
This is because the sequential service constraint upon goods supply commitments
implies that in any equilibrium, the allocation of resources must satisfy
Ci(s) > Ci(s – 1) (3.6)
for each type z and each state s > 1. It is not possible to arrange for a given type
to not be allowed to consume w much in a high-demand state as he or she is able to
in a low-demand state, even though mtimization of average expected utility would
require it, Let us call the allocation {q(s)} that maximizes (3.1) subject to (3.4) for
all states and (3.6) for each type and all states the second-best allocation, In the
second-best allocation, for each type i, ci(s) = G for all s z Si, while Ci(s) = O for
stat es s < ~a, if any, 18 The second-best quantity limits {~i} are characterized (again
ignoring corner solutions) by the first-order conditions
for each i, where a >0 is determined by the requirement that (1.3) hold with equality.
It will be observed that in the polar case defined by (3,2), the first-best and second-
best allocations coincide; but this is essentially the only case in which they do.
Let us now consider optimal policy in that polar cme, the case of demand fluc-
tuations on the intensive margin only. In this case, there exists a direct monetary
policy that achieves the first-best allocation; this is plainly an optimal policy, among
laAsfar as the constrained maximization isconcerned,consumption instates s < ~i need not equal
zero, though this is one solution. We define this sa the second-best allocation in order to obtain a
unique allocation, and because this is the only kind of wlution to the constrained maximum problem
that can corr~pond to an equilibrium,
25the class of direct policies. The policy that achieves it is a constant-money-supply
policy, i.e., a correspondence r of the form
r = {(P,F)IF=F*}, (3.8)
for any F* > –D (so that the constant money SUPPIYis equal to M* = D+ F* > 0).
The associated stationary equilibrium is given by ci(s) = ~i) Mi(s) = A4 * Zi/g for
each type z in each state s; the quantity limits {Ei} me defined by
~~~’(~~)= ~ >0 (3.9)
for each i, and the requirement that (1.3) hold with equality; ~i = A4 * G/y for each
type;
and the sequence






{P,} is defined by (2.4), using (3.10a). The sequence {r,} is chosen
and
6(s)
‘s2 ~b(l) .;, ‘d





T,[E,>. ~s] - ~s+l[~s,>s+, ~s’1
p(s) = - (3.10e)
T(s) -
for all s <3. Substitution of these values into the equilibrium conditions listed at the
end of section 2 allows one to verify that all conditiom for a stationary equilibrium
are satisfied.
Furthermore, any policy that achieves the first-best outcome in case (3.2) must
be essentially of this kind. For it is only possible to have a common value of c(s)
in all states if aggregate expenditure Y(s) ,“and hence the money supply M(s), is
the same in all states. It is e~ily verified that all of conditions (3.10) must hold
in any equilibrium that results in the first-best allocation. The. monetary policy
correspondence r consistent with such an equilibrium must possess a vertical segment,
for at least the range of values for p(s) in which one finds all of the elements in the
sequence defined by (3. 10d)–(3. 10e), and it is only this part of the correspondence
that matters in equilibrium.
The conclusion that the fist-best allocation can be attained, even in this case,
depends upon assuming that direct control of the volume of lending (and of the money
supply) is possible, In particulm, if for any s > 1,
26there is a contradiction between (3. 1OC)-(3. 10e) and the reqtiement that p(s’) >0
for all s’ z s. This implies that no indirect policy is co~istent with the first-best
outcome, though a direct policy of the form (3.8) is.
Rather than develop fufiher the question of what can be achieved by indirect
policy in such a case, let us turn instead to t~te variations of a form other than
(3.2). In general, the first-best allocation cannot be achieved, even by a direct policy.
And when it cannot be, it is not generally true that the best policy is of the form
(3.8), even if complete control of the money supply is possible.
The second polar case, variation puely on the extensive margin, = described by
(3.3), illustrates this in an especially sharp way. It is ewily seen that the fist-best is
not attainable in this c~e, but the second-best allocation is, and so optimal policies
are those that support this allocation. A policy that achieves it, and is therefore
optimal, is a perfectly elastic supply of funds,
r = {(P, F)[T = ~“}, (3.11)
where the nominal interest rate r“ is equal to Q–l. The msociated station~ equilib-
rium is given by the second-best allocation defined above; borrowing plans according
to which, for each type, Mi(s) = O for all s < ~, and M;(s)
and quantity limits {G} defined by (3.7) and the requirement
equality, and {fii} defied by
~~ = V-1~1~~’(5~)
= M~ for all S ~ g~;
that (1.3) hold with
for some v >0 (independent of i). The series {p,} is given by (2.4), using the value
A = av-l, while the series {r., p(s)} are given by TS = p(s) = P-l for each s. Again,
substitution of these values into the equilibrium conditions at the end of section 2
allows one to verify that all conditions for a stationary equilibrium are satisfied.
tithermore, any policy rule that achieves the second-best outcome in case (3.3)
must be essentially of this kind. For given the second-best allocation, w characterized
above, (2.23) requires that for each type z,
~i~’(~) = BJPAT%.
Substitution of (2.4) into this and comparison with (3.7) then implies that r% =
a(~v~)-l for each i, and hence that r. is the same for all s. As rl must equal ~-1,
this must be the common value for r(s) (i.e., Au = a). so that TS = ~-1 for each
state such that M(s) > M(s – 1). Then (2.8), together with the monotonicity of
r, implies that p(s) = ~-1 for all s ss well. Thus r must at lesst have a horizontal
segment at height ~– 1, which segment includes all of the points at which equilibria
of the interbank market occur in any state. In particular, a constant-money-supply
rule is clearly not optimal, as it is inconsistent with the second-best allocation in this
case.
The el~tic money supply (or interest-rate smoothing) rule (3.11) does increase
the volatility of aggregate demand, in this case, as in traditional analyses like that
27of Poole (1970). And, for the same reasons w are stressed in LUCU and Woodford
(1994), the resulting uncertainty about aggregate demand results in equilibrium sup-
ply commitments that cause some capacity to be left unused in some states. But this
does not imply that such a policy leads to a less efficient allocation of resources. Idle
capacity is inconsistent with attainment of the first-best allocation, but it may be con-
sist ent with attainment of the second-best, as it is in this case. Given the sequential
service constraint, the idle capacity in low-demand states is a necessary consequence
of the fact that an optimal frwtion of capacity is committed to the supply of goods
to types of buyers that consume only in high-demand states.
The efficiency result obtained in this polar case is closely related to Prescott’s
(1975) argument for the efficiency of an equilibrium with idle capacity. Prescott’s
model is one in which prices are fixed in advance for individual units of capacity, but
these are not committed to the supply of goods to individual buyers. Yet the equi-
librium in his model is formally analogous to the goods market equilibrium described
here; the crucial difference is that S.She assumes no cash-in-advance constraint on
purchases, his buyers behave in the way that buyers do in the present model when
facing a perfectly elastic supply of credit at a zero interest rate. However, in the
present model, an el=tic supply of credit at a positive interest rate results in the
same allocation of resources as would a zero interest rate; equilibrium goods prices
and borrowing are simply all resealed by a certain positive factor. Thus the equi-
librium allocation here in the case of an elmtic supply of credit at the interest rate
r“ = ~-1 is the same ~ in Prescott’s model, which he shows to be efficient in the
case of certain preferences that constitute a special case of (3.3).
The two polm c~es illustrate in their pure form two alternative considerations
with regard to optimal monetary policy, that will more typically each deserve some
weight. On the one hand, insofar u demmd uncertainty has to do with variation
in the intensity of demand of all buyers (the intensive margin), interest rates rising
with the volume of transactions will be desirable, w a way of inducing buyers to
stabilize their level of purchases, reducing the degree to which producers of goods
allow capacity to remain idle in low-demand states. But on the other hand, insofar
as demand uncertainty has to do with variations in the number of buyers in the
market (the extensive mwgin), interest-rate smoothing (and a money supply that
varies with transactions demand) will be desirable, as a way of avoiding equilibrium
goods and loan supply commitments that unduly benefit buyers with stable demand
at the expense of those with volatile demand. Both considerations will deserve some
weight, and the optimal funds supply schedule will in general be neither perfectly
vertical nor perfectly horizontal, but upward-sloping.
This can be illustrated with a simple example of an intermediate case. Let there
be two types and two states; with 61{2) > 61(1) >0, 6Q(2) >0, 62(1) = O. In this cue
as well, the second-best allocation of resources is attainable. The policy that achieves
it can be shown to involve
p(2) – p(l) =
28M(2) - M(l) = Z*
&f(l) “ 7r2El
Fixing the other parameters and letting 61(2) approach 61(1), the optimal degree of
variation in the interbank funds rate goes to zero, while the optimal money supply
remains higher in the high-demand state; in this limit, the optimal supply correspon-
dence becomes arbitrarily flat. But if one lets 61(2) be made ubitrarily large, the
optimal degree of variation in the money supply goes to zero (since Z2/C1 approaches
zero), while the optimal increase in the interbank funds rate in the high-demand state
becomes arbitrarily large; in this limit, the optimal supply correspondence becomes
arbitrarily steep. Intermediate values of 61(2) can be found that will make optimal
any arbitrarily chosen slope for the central bank’s funds supply correspondence.
4 Conclusion
We have exhibited an equilibrium model with loan commitments, and seen how the
terms of these differ according to borrower characteristics. A monetmy policy that
involves relatively little accommodation of the incremed credit demand in high ag-
gregate demand states results in a greater degree of discrimination among types of
borrowers in the terms of equilibrium loan commitments, and hence a greater degree
of constriction of the relative access of borrowers with more volatile demand for credit
in high-demand states. We have seen that under certain circumstances the efficiency
of resource allocation is reduced by such a policy (in the sense that average expected
utility is lower), despite the fact that it stabilizes aggregate demand for goods, and as
a result allows a higher average degree of utilization of existing productive capacity.
This is because it may be desirable for monet~ arrangements to allow borrowers
with highly cyclical demand to be able to purchase goods in the states where they have
particulm need for such purchases, even at the expense of allowing some productive
capacity to remain idle in low-demand states.
This restit provides a rationale for interest-rate smoothing as a goal of monetary
policy, even in the absence of stoch~tic disturbances to money demand of the kind
considered by Poole (1970). Several qualifications to this conclusion, however, are in
order. First of all, complete interest-rate smoothing h= been shown to be optimal
only in a certain polm c=e, in which the only sort of demand uncertainty relates
to variation on the “extensive margin”, More generally, some degree of increase in
interest rates in high-demand states will be desirable, as illustrated by the example
at the end of section 3. Second, even in the polm c=e, the argument here does not
really imply that nominal interest rates need be held forever constant. The efficiency
gain demonstrated simply requires that the central bank commit itself to an elastic
supply of funds at a given nominal interest rate during each period, which interest
rate is fu~y predictable at the beginning of the period (in pmticular, at the time
that loan commitments are negotiated), There is no necessity that this interest rate
be the same in all periods; the latter feature of the optimal policy considered above
results from our restriction of attention to stationary policies, in which the monetary
29policy correspondence r is the same each period. Thus our model really provides a
motive for enswing short-run predictability of nominal interest rates, rather than a
genuine interest rate peg. It thus provides a possible justification for what Goodfriend
(1991) reports as the U.S. Federal Reserve’s efforts to avoid “whipsawing the market”,
and for the widespread use of a short-term nominal interest rate as the instrument
of monetary policy, without implying that nominal interest rates should not, for
example, be eventually raised if inflation increases.
How fm in advance does it matter that nominal interest rates be predictable?
The answer provided by our model is, as f~ in advance as the time lag over which
the terms of loan commitments are not adjusted to reflect new market conditions.
It might be thought that, in practice, this should not be long, and that as a result
little smoothing of interest rates is justified. But it should be noted that the model
also implies that monetary tightening should not be effective as way of offsetting the
effects of real disturbances to aggregate demand, nor needed in order to prevent such
disturbances from tiecting the degree of utilization of productive capacity, except
insofar w the monet~ tightening occurs before information about the shock and
the monetary response to it can be incorporated into the terms upon which goods are
offered for sale. Thus as long as the lags in the adjustment of loan commitments are
as long as the lags in the adjustment of goods supply commitments (as assumed here),
there is no scope for using monetary policy to moderate the effects of real demand
disturbances upoh capacity utilization, without its having the consequences for the
allocation of credit among different types of borrowers that have been illustrated
above.
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